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 The American Right features a well-developed—and well-heeled—infrastructure for 
promoting a conception of freedom as inextricable from capitalism.  The American Left, by 
contrast, has seemed content to cede the territory, abandoning the ground of freedom for the 
terrain of “equality,” “justice,” “fairness,” and “prosperity.”  This paper is an effort to address 
this asymmetry in the public discourse over the meaning of freedom.  Its principal objective is to 
capture the vision of freedom embodied in the political and economic thought of Louis D. 
Brandeis, one of the American Left’s ablest expositors of freedom.   
 In addition, the paper has three subsidiary objectives.  The most important of these is to 
help put an end to the American Left’s defensive crouch in debates over the nature of freedom.  
To that end, I leverage Brandeis’s conceptions of freedom, the state, and the market into a more 
general argument about the nexus between those three phenomena.  In particular, I cast the 
welfare and regulatory state as an organ of empowerment and emancipation rather than of 
restraint and inhibition, and I depict the untrammeled market not as a wellspring of freedom and 
creativity but as a source of constraint and enervation.  The second subsidiary objective is to 
prod libertarians to interrogate the equation of the market with freedom and government with 
 v 
constraint, in the hope of provoking a more robust and critical discourse over whether the 
libertarian program of meager government and unfettered markets truly advances the ideal of 
freedom.  Finally, the paper aims not only to identify fault-lines between Left and Right but also 
to differentiate Brandeis’s understanding of freedom from that of his Progressive brethren, in 
particular those Progressives who favored Theodore Roosevelt’s “New Nationalism” over 
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“I am still puzzled,” wrote libertarian economist and political theorist Friedrich A. Hayek 
in 1956, “why those in the United States who truly believe in liberty should . . . have allowed the 
left to appropriate this almost indispensable term.”
1
  Sixty years later, Hayek’s comment seems 
out of place.  In the decades since Hayek puzzled over the failure of the American Right to take 
up the mantle of freedom, conservatives and libertarians have draped themselves in the garb of 
liberty.  From grassroots organizations such as the Tea Party and FreedomWorks, to think tanks 
like the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, and the American Enterprise Institute, to the 
“Freedom Caucus” in the United States House of Representatives, the American Right features a 
well-developed—and well-heeled—infrastructure for promoting a conception of freedom as 
inextricable from capitalism.  The American Left, by contrast, has seemed content to cede the 
territory, abandoning the ground of freedom for the terrain of “equality,” “justice,” “fairness,” 
and “prosperity.” 
This paper is an effort to address this asymmetry in the public discourse over the meaning 
of freedom.  Its foremost objective is to capture the vision of freedom embodied in the political 
and economic thought of Louis D. Brandeis, one of the American Left’s ablest expositors of 
freedom.  Scholars from across the disciplinary spectrum—from law, political science, history, 
and economics—have written extensively about Brandeis’s life and thought, and I rely heavily 
on those sources.  This, however, is the first analysis devoted exclusively to Brandeis’s 
conception of freedom.   
                                                        
1
 The Collected Works of F.A. Hayek: The Road to Serfdom, Text and Documents, The Definitive 
Edition, Volume II, Ed. Bruce Caldwell (Routledge, London: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 
45.  
 2 
The ideal of freedom admits of many interpretations.  This paper largely eschews this 
definitional thicket, for its object is not to arrive at the one True Freedom but rather to 
understand the meaning of freedom in the political and economic thought of Louis Brandeis.  
Brandeis never laid down a comprehensive political or economic system.  Yet the Brandeisian 
creed is discoverable nevertheless; it must be cobbled together from a lifetime of action and 
argument.  This is an attempt to illuminate one facet of that creed: its singular conception of 
freedom.         
 Although the chief ambition of this paper is to add a fresh perspective to the corpus of 
scholarly work on Brandeis’s political and economic thought, the paper has three subsidiary 
objectives.  The most important of these is to help put an end to the American Left’s defensive 
crouch in debates over the nature of freedom.  This is too expansive a project to be undertaken 
here, but I offer this paper as a contribution, however modest, to that larger endeavor.  The goal 
here is to treat Brandeis’s political and economic thought not only as a compelling subject in its 
own right, but also as a potential roadmap for countering the American Right’s co-optation of the 
ideal of freedom.  To that end, I leverage Brandeis’s views of freedom, the state, and the market 
into a more general argument about the nexus between those three phenomena.  In particular, I 
cast the welfare and regulatory state as an organ of empowerment and emancipation rather than 
of restraint and inhibition, and I depict the untrammeled market not as a wellspring of freedom 
and creativity but as a source of constraint and enervation.  
 The second subsidiary objective is to prod libertarians to interrogate the equation of the 
market with freedom and government with constraint.  Hayek dedicated The Road to Serfdom to 




  I offer this paper in that same spirit—in the hope that, while there can be no 
compromising the centrality of freedom to libertarian thought, there might at least occur in 
libertarian circles a more robust and critical discourse over whether the libertarian program of 
meager government and unfettered markets truly advances the ideal of freedom.  I draw from the 
libertarian and not from the conservative canon because it is the libertarian tradition that has 
chiefly animated the American Right’s embrace of freedom.  Thus, when I refer to “the 
American Right,” I mean only the libertarian Right.  While it is worth remaining cognizant of the 
extent to which American conservatives, from Barry Goldwater to Ronald Reagan to George W. 
Bush, have blended libertarianism with social, religious, and foreign policy conservatism, that is 
not my focus here.  
Finally, this paper aims not only to identify fault-lines between Left and Right but also to 
differentiate Brandeis’s understanding of freedom from that of his Progressive brethren.  To that 
end, it highlights two critical distinctions between Brandeis and many of his Progressive 
contemporaries, in particular those Progressives who favored Theodore Roosevelt’s “New 
Nationalism” over Woodrow Wilson’s “New Freedom” in the presidential election of 1912.  The 
first of these distinctions concerns the relative position of freedom within a larger hierarchy of 
competing values.  Indeed, where Brandeis elevated freedom as the highest ideal—to which all 
other goods, including material well-being, were ultimately subordinate—the “Rooseveltian 
Progressives” tended to assign freedom to a less exalted position relative to competing goods.  In 
particular, they tended to sacrifice freedom to the demands of efficiency and social utility.  The 
second distinction goes to the nature of freedom itself.  Where Brandeis rooted his conception of 
                                                        
2
 “There can be no doubt,” wrote Hayek, “that . . . the belief that socialists would bring freedom 
is genuine and sincere.  But this would only heighten the tragedy if it should prove that what was 
promised to us as the Road to Freedom was in fact the High Road to Servitude.”  Collected 
Works, 78.  
 4 
freedom in the ideals of self-ownership and local autonomy, the Rooseveltians tended to equate 
freedom with a rising standard of living, to be achieved by strengthening the central government 
and entrusting its stewardship to enlightened experts.  This difference was crucial, for it led 
Brandeis to reject the Rooseveltians’ embrace of centralized, expert-driven governance as 
incompatible with freedom.  The aim here is not merely to highlight fissures within 
Progressivism that are worth investigating in their own right.  It is also to encourage the 
American Left to rediscover the virtues of local control and to maintain a healthy distrust of 
elite-managed governance.  
The paper is divided into two parts.  The first tackles Brandeis’s conception of individual 
freedom.  It begins with a general examination of conceptions of individual freedom as a state of 
being—that is, as a condition of mind and spirit—and proceeds to examine Brandeis’s notion of 
individual freedom in particular.  Building on that analysis, it explores how Brandeis’s 
conception of freedom as a condition of mind and spirit influenced his political and economic 
thought.  To that end, it homes in on Brandeis’s abhorrence of the twin evils of mass 
consumerism and economic centralization.  It then moves to a discussion of Brandeis’s approach 
to antitrust and the fault lines within the Progressive Movement that defined the presidential 
election of 1912, a contest in which Brandeis played a pivotal role as an advisor to Woodrow 
Wilson.  Finally, it examines the exalted position of the independent small businessman in 
Brandeis’s conception of freedom and highlights historical parallels with the political thought of 
Thomas Jefferson.  In drawing out the kinship between Brandeis and Jefferson, the paper 
explores both Brandeis’s vision for a Jewish homeland in Palestine and the commonalities 
between Brandeis’s ideal of the independent small businessman and the yeoman farmer of 
Jeffersonian lore.  
 5 
The second part concerns the nexus between freedom and democracy in Brandeis’s 
political thought.  It begins by distinguishing Brandeis’s embrace of democracy as an organ of 
freedom with the libertarian understanding of democracy as a potential threat to freedom.  In so 
doing, it likens Brandeis’s vision of democracy as a fount of spiritual and psychological 
enrichment to Jefferson’s notion of the “ward republic,” designed to engage citizens in the 
everyday practice of self-government.  It then proceeds to examine Brandeis’s conception of the 
labor movement as a force for worker emancipation and concludes by analyzing the relationship 
between Brandeis’s conception of freedom and his vision for workplace democracy.     
II.        FREEDOM OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
 a. Individual Freedom as a State of Being, Right and Left 
 
Thinkers on both the American Left and the American Right have long converged on the 
notion that freedom is a state of being—with spiritual and psychological, as well as physical, 
dimensions.  Franklin Roosevelt's “four freedoms,” enunciated in the waning days of World War 
II and designed to set the agenda for the post-war global order, encompassed freedoms that 
allowed for action: specifically, freedom of expression and freedom of worship.
3
  But 
Roosevelt's typology also embraced freedoms that girded mind and spirit against the privations 
of life under capitalism: namely, freedom from fear and freedom from want.
4
  For Roosevelt, 
there was a spiritual and psychological underpinning to freedom.
5
  Freedom meant the thrusting 
                                                        
3
 Cass R. Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need It 
More Than Ever (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 2. 
4
 Ibid., 61-95.  
5
 To be sure, Roosevelt also discerned a material underpinning to freedom.  “[W]e have come to 
a clear realization,” he proclaimed, “of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist without 
economic security and independence.”  Ibid., 12. 
 6 
off of all shackles, whether overt and physical or subtle and psychological.  “Necessitous men,” 
Roosevelt insisted, “are not free men.”
6
   
Roosevelt’s solicitude for the human mind and spirit was characteristic of Progressive era 
and New Deal reformers.  For Progressives and New Dealers, the unrestrained market vitiated 
mind and spirit by miring workers in endless toil.  The American worker survived without living.  
Market fundamentalism, declared Progressive social scientist Horace Kallen, had become 
“anathema among lovers of liberty.”
7
  Government, with its capacity to ensure basic economic 




The notion of freedom as a state of being, as a kind of interior life, has long been a staple 
of libertarian thought as well.  “[T]he most important change which extensive government 
control produces,” wrote Hayek, “is a psychological change, an alteration in the character of the 
people.”
9
  For libertarians, the danger to mind and spirit emanates not from unfettered capitalism, 
but rather from the welfare and regulatory state.  In libertarian thought, to be free is to be daring 
and adventurous, creative and individualistic, independent and self-sustaining.  These properties 
are born of the hardy experience of the “self-made” individual.  The market acts as the crucible 
                                                        
6
 Ibid.  
7





 Collected Works, 48-49.  
 7 
out of which this sturdiness of mind and spirit emerges.
10
  The state, by contrast, enervates mind 
and spirit, “gradually smother[ing] the creative powers of a free civilization . . . .”
11
  
In examining the relationship of the state to freedom in libertarian thought, it is useful to 
distinguish the welfare from the regulatory state.  While both the welfare and the regulatory state 
“paralyze the driving forces of a free society[,]” each assumes a distinctive role in the libertarian 
aversion to state power.
12
  For libertarians, the welfare state saps the life from mind and spirit by 
subverting the ethic of individual responsibility, that great wellspring of human maturation.  The 
welfare state breeds dependency and helplessness; it “actively discourages self-help by crippling 
the incentive for rehabilitation.”
13
  Reduced to a form of serfdom, mind and spirit languish, never 




The regulatory state, for its part, weakens mind and spirit by upwardly transferring 
responsibility from individuals themselves to remote bureaucrats, leaving an inert population in 
its wake.
15
  “The so-called economic freedom which the planners promise us,” Hayek 
                                                        
10
 With the advent of free markets, writes libertarian political theorist Murray Rothbard, 
“[e]ntrepreneurs were to be free at last to compete, to develop, to create.  The shackles of control 
were to be lifted from land, labor, and capital alike.”  Murray N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty: 
The Libertarian Manifesto (Auburn: Skyler J. Collins, Large Print ed., 2012), 3. 
11
 Collected Works, 45.  
12
 See Ibid. 
13
 Rothbard, For a New Liberty, 206.  
14
 In libertarian thought, these virtues are often tied to the human struggle to transform nature 
into a means of survival and prosperity.  Human beings, wrote Rothbard, “can only survive and 
flourish by grappling with the earth around them. . . .  [T]hey must also, in order to survive and 
maintain themselves, transform the resources given by nature . . . into objects more suitable for 
their use and consumption.”  Ibid., 37. 
15
 Hayek frames this transfer of responsibility thusly: “The question is whether . . . it is better 
that the holder of coercive power should confine himself in general to creating conditions under 
which the knowledge and initiative of individuals are given the best scope so that they can plan 
most successfully; or whether a rational utilization of our resources requires central direction and 
 8 
maintained, “means precisely that we are to be relieved of the necessity of solving our own 
economic problems and that the bitter choices which this often involves are to be made for us.”
16
  
Just as initiative and ingenuity wilt under the largesse of the welfare state, so too does the 
regulatory state promote the listlessness and complacency that accompany rule from above.
17
   
For libertarians, the market stands as the antidote to the enervating influence of the 
welfare and regulatory state.  Where the welfare state dispenses goods and services as a matter of 
right, market participants fight tooth and claw to prosper, cultivating that sturdiness of mind and 
spirit that is the core of inner freedom.
18
  Where the regulatory state vests decision-making 
power in remote bureaucrats, the market entrusts that power to individual producers and 
consumers.  Where the market reigns, the motive force of humanity flourishes.  Under the weight 
of a benevolent Leviathan, that motive force atrophies.
19
  “The great advances of civilization . . . 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
organization of all our activities according to some consciously constructed ‘blueprint.’”  
Collected Works, 85.  
16
 Ibid., 127.  
17
 In The Road to Serfdom, Hayek cites a British sociological survey to capture this degradation 
of mind and spirit.  Its portrait of the British regulatory state is typical of libertarian thought: 
Special agencies, called Citizen’s Advice Bureaus, are set up to steer the 
bewildered through the forest of rules, and to indicate to the persistent the rare 
clearings where a private person may still make a choice. . . .  [The town lad] is 
conditioned not to lift a finger without referring mentally to the book of words 
first.  A time-budget of an ordinary city youth for an ordinary working day would 
show that he spends great stretches of his waking hours going through motions 
that have been predetermined for him by directives in whose framing he has had 
no part, whose precise intention he seldom understands. . . .  Surveying his 
parents and his older brothers or sisters he finds them as regulation bound as 
himself.  He sees them so acclimated to that state that they seldom plan and carry 
out under their own steam any new social excursion or enterprise.  He thus looks 
forward to no future period at which a sinewy faculty of responsibility is likely to 
be of service to himself or others.    
  See Ibid., 48-49.  
18
 “[E]ach individual,” writes Rothbard, “must think, learn, value, and choose his or her ends and 
means in order to survive and flourish . . . .”  Rothbard, For a New Liberty, 34. 
19
 It is precisely this motive force—and not the largesse of the welfare state—that libertarians 
insist will propel the poor out of poverty.  “[O]ne of the most significant ways in which the 
 9 
have never come from centralized government,” wrote libertarian economist Milton Friedman.  
“Government . . . replace[s] mediocrity for the variety essential for that experimentation which 
can bring tomorrow’s laggards above today’s mean.”
20
   For Brandeis, however, government 
properly deployed did not suppress mind and spirit.  Rather, government played a role in 
preserving human vitality against the enervating tendencies of capitalism.  
 b. Individual Freedom in Brandeisian Thought 
 
Brandeis was aghast at the human suffering that industrialization had wrought, and he 
believed that government had an obligation to improve the lives of the poor and the middle class.  
That is, he embraced government as a vehicle for promoting social utility.
21
  Without minimum 
wage and maximum hours legislation, public works programs, unemployment insurance, and 
vigorous supervision of the market to ensure free competition and fair prices, poverty and 
stagnation would continue to afflict the American working class.
22
 
The impulses that motivated Brandeis were not principally utilitarian, however.  For 
Brandeis, the promotion of material well-being was a vital function of a society, but it was not its 
raison d’etre.  The ultimate end of a society was not material progress but rather the cultivation 
of a particular sort of human being, possessed of an elevated cast of mind and spirit.  “[A]lways 
and everywhere,” Brandeis averred, “the intellectual, moral, and spiritual development of those 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
government could aid the poor,” wrote Rothbard, “is by removing its own direct roadblocks from 
their productive energies.”  Ibid., 194. 
20
 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 
3-4. 
21
 In part, Brandeis saw government’s obligation to promote the general welfare as a corrective 
for its own failings: “If the government permits conditions to exist which make large classes of 
citizens financially dependent, the great evil of dependence should at least be minimized by the 
State’s assuming, or causing to be assumed by others, in some form the burdens incidents to its 
own shortcomings.”  Philippa Strum, Brandeis: Beyond Progressivism (Lawrence, Kansas: 
University Press of Kansas, 1993), 159.  
22
 Ibid., 144-45. 
 10 
concerned will remain an essential—and the main factor—in real betterment.”
23
  For Brandeis, 
the goal was not to maintain a sated population, for “[i]mprovement in material conditions of the 
worker and ease are the incidents of better conditions—valuable mainly as they may ever 
increase the opportunities for development.”
24
  Rather, the aim was to nurture an engaged and 
vibrant citizenry, one capable of ingenuity and creativity.  “For our objective,” wrote Brandeis, 
“is the making of men and women who shall be free, self-respecting members of a democracy—
and who shall be worthy of respect.”
25
   
In testimony before the United States Commission on Industrial Relations in 1915, 
Brandeis articulated this distinction thusly: 
Commissioner Lennon:  Mr. Brandeis, in speaking with regard to the physical 
betterment that has come about . . . in these great industries, did you mean . . . that 
these physical betterments were not something of an element toward progress, 
toward democratic manhood? 
 
Mr. Brandeis:  They are all gains for manhood; and we recognize that manhood is 
what we are striving for in America.  We are striving for democracy; we are 
striving for the development of men.  It is absolutely essential in order that men 
may develop that they be properly fed and properly housed, and that they have 
proper opportunities of education and recreation.  We can not reach our goal 





The term “manhood” should be construed here neither as an exaltation of masculine virtues nor 
as an affront to women.  Brandeis embraced the cause of women’s suffrage, albeit after an initial 
period of opposition, and he deeply admired the women with whom he worked as a progressive 
                                                        
23
 Brandeis on Democracy, ed. Philippa Strum (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 










  Instead, “manhood” signifies a particular condition of mind and spirit: the mind of 
the creative individual, the spirit of sturdy self-reliance.  These—and not the blessings of 
material prosperity—were the markers of the free individual, for “we may have” material well-
being and still “have a nation of slaves.”
28
  
Just as spiritual and psychological vitality takes on a pivotal role in Brandeis’s 
conception of freedom, so too does it occupy a privileged place in libertarian thought.  But where 
libertarians conceive of capitalism as a fount of spiritual and psychological invigoration, the 
untrammeled market operates in Brandeis’s vision of freedom as a source of mental and spiritual 
enervation.  In libertarian thought, the welfare and regulatory state reduces the individual to the 
condition of a passive observer in a world shaped by alien forces.
29
  Under the market, by 
contrast, individuals act not as inert spectators to power but rather as the protagonists of their 
own lives, imbued with personal agency.  This exercise of agency enlivens the human mind and 
spirit, bracing them for the rigors of a free life.
30
 
Brandeis insisted that, in fact, the untrammeled market deprived individuals of agency.  
The underlying structure of his argument mirrored that of libertarianism: human beings, Brandeis 
                                                        
27
 Jeffrey Rosen, Louis D. Brandeis: American Prophet, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2016), 19-20.  
28
 Brandeis On Democracy, 101.  
29
 For Hayek, this state of passivity had helped pave the way for the Third Reich: “It was that a 
larger part of the civil life of Germany than of any other country was deliberately organized from 
the top, so that a large proportion of her people did not regard themselves as independent but as 
appointed functionaries, which gave her social structure its peculiar character.”  Collected 
Writings, 153, 155.   
30
 This, Rothbard claimed, is the natural course of human existence.  For the state to interfere in 
this salutary process is to violate man’s very nature.  As Rothbard writes, “the nature of man is 
such that each individual person must . . . choose his own ends and employ his own means . . . to 
attain them. . . .  [E]ach man must learn about himself and the world, use his mind to select 
values, learn about cause and effect, and act purposively to maintain himself and advance his 
life. . . .  [I]t becomes vitally necessary for each man’s survival and prosperity that he be free to 
learn, choose, develop his faculties, and act upon his knowledge and values.”  Rothbard, For a 
New Liberty, 33.  
 12 
maintained, could be spiritually and psychologically vital only when they assumed responsibility 
for themselves and for the world around them.
31
  For Brandeis, as for libertarians, vitality of 
mind and spirit entailed both self-sufficiency and self-governance.  But where the champions of 
unfettered capitalism argued that the welfare and regulatory state suffocated the self-made, self-
governing individual, Brandeis saw that such an individual emerged only with the aid of a 
smartly designed welfare and regulatory state.
32
 
What, then, did Brandeis’s conviction that the untethered market eroded spiritual and 
psychological freedom mean in practice?  How did he propose to deploy the state as a cudgel 
against mental and spiritual poverty?  Two interwoven strains in Brandeisian thought come to the 
fore: first, his opposition to the twin phenomena of economic concentration and mass 
consumerism; second, his embrace of the small businessman.    
 c. Concentration, Consumerism, and Human Decline 
 
 Brandeis harbored deep misgivings about the economy of mass consumption that was 
beginning to take hold at the turn of the 20th century.  These apprehensions derived from his 
faith in individual responsibility as the wellspring for human vitality.  “The great developer,” 
Brandeis maintained, “is responsibility.”
33
  Again, Brandeis’s conception of individual 
responsibility as the source of human maturation reveals a kinship with libertarianism.  But 
where libertarians insist that the market fosters individual responsibility, Brandeis discerns in 
unregulated capitalism the very infirmity that libertarians ascribe to the welfare and regulatory 
state: namely, an upward transfer of power and responsibility from individuals and communities 
to remote superintendents.  Those superintendents changed form.  In the corridors of state power, 
                                                        
31
 See Strum, Brandeis: Beyond Progressivism, 36, 46-47. 
32
 See Ibid., 146. 
33
 Brandeis On Democracy, 34.  
 13 
they were legislators, bureaucrats, and lobbyists; in the market, they were managers, financiers, 
and corporate boards.
34
  For Brandeis, however, the basic malady inhered in big business no less 
than in big government. 
For Brandeis, responsibility of the kind that nourished mind and spirit meant control over 
productive enterprise.  By the dawn of the 20th century, such control had come to reside in a 
small class of quasi-oligarchs.  Brandeis feared that the individual’s ever-lessening control over 
the nature and direction of productive enterprise would debase the human psyche.  If control of 
productive enterprise remained with an elite few, the mass of citizens would become tools rather 
than agents of production, their sights fixed on stultifying tasks imposed by alien forces.
35
  The 
object of those tasks, their duration and frequency, the manner of performing them—these would 
be determined not by individuals themselves, but by floor supervisors, middle managers, and 
corporate boards.  Under the untrammeled market, Brandeis argued, the dynamic process of 
creation would become the province of a privileged few.  For the many, the unregulated market 
offered only tedium and servility.
36
  
                                                        
34
 Brandeis regularly compared the growth of corporate power with the development of 
repressive political power.  “The development of our financial oligarchy followed . . . lines with 
which the history of political despotism has familiarized us: usurpation, proceeding by gradual 
encroachment rather than by violent acts; subtle and often long-concealed concentration of 
distinct functions, which are beneficent when separately administered, and dangerous only when 
combined in the same persons.”  Louis D. Brandeis, Other People’s Money and How the Bankers 
Use It (iBooks Edition: Mustbe Interactive, 1914), 6. 
35
 The severing of the personal ties between employer and employee that existed prior to the age 
of mass production figured prominently in Brandeis’s critique of modern industrial society.  As 
Strum writes, Brandeis was greatly troubled by the fact that “[t]he giant trusts had amassed so 
much economic power that most Americans would spend their lives working for faceless 
employers in huge enterprises to which they felt no personal connection.”  Strum, Brandeis: 
Beyond Progressivism, 82.  
36
 Strum captures Brandeis’s diagnosis thusly: “Brandeis was angered not only because 
[workers] were being exploited . . . but also because they were being turned into automatons 
unable to learn about and participate in the political process, with the result that the country was 
becoming far less democratic.”  Ibid. 
 14 
The corollary was that, as a dwindling few came to dominate the creative process of 
production, a growing many were relegated to the passive activity of consumption.  The 
organization of economic life became the project of a shrinking minority; for most, the economy 
descended from above as a thing to be consumed rather than constructed.  “A society in which a 
few men are the employers and the great body are merely employees or servants,” Brandeis 
argued, “is not the most desirable in a republic . . . .”
37
  The widening distance between the 
individual citizen and the corridors of economic power, wherein the powerful fashioned the 
macroeconomy for consumption by the mass public, informed Brandeis’s pleas for economic 
decentralization.  For only through the maintenance of modest enterprise—in the stewardship of 
which average people could participate—could a society of producers, rather than consumers, be 
preserved.  “[I]t should be as much the policy of the laws to multiply the numbers engaged in 




Brandeis insisted that economic centralization generated inefficiency.  The “curse of 
bigness,” in Brandeis’s telling, brought with it unwieldy bureaucracies and gratuitous 
middlemen.
39
  For Brandeis, this was true of governments and corporations alike.  But 
Brandeis’s embrace of the small unit in both politics and economics clashed with the dominant 
intelligentsia’s attachment to large-scale enterprise.  According to then-prevailing wisdom, the 
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 Brandeis identified the investment banker as a particularly noxious financial intermediary.  
“Though properly but middlemen, these bankers bestride as masters America’s business world, 
so that practically no large enterprise can be undertaken successfully without their participation 
or approval.”  Brandeis, Other People’s Money, 5. 
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great trusts—when properly regulated—offered an array of efficiencies, from economies of scale 
and shared expertise to the surplus capital that underwrote research and development.
40
 
For Brandeis, however, efficiency was secondary.  More important was the fact that 
economic concentration vested control over the character and direction of productive enterprise 
in a cadre of corporate titans.
41
  The wider public were left to consume the fruits of large-scale 
capitalism while toiling in enterprises they neither influenced nor fully understood.  As a 
consequence, their creative capacities atrophied; their inner vitality withered.  Their minds and 
spirits took the shape of their daily lives: passive, myopic, and disengaged.
42
  If individual 
responsibility was the wellspring of spiritual and psychological development, the defining 
feature of an unregulated market was that workers and consumers were responsible for little that 
was invigorating or ennobling.    
There is a kinship here between Brandeis’s aversion to consumerism and the dystopic 
vision of an anemic humanity that appears in libertarian assaults on the welfare and regulatory 
state.  The libertarian specter of a torpid population springs from the notion that the welfare and 
regulatory state makes people spectators to, rather than participants in, the construction of 
economic, social, and political life.
43
  As passive observers to their own lives, individuals grow 
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soft and supine; their grand ambitions give way to the meaner concerns of the appetite.
44
  
Brandeis feared this same specter of dependence and febrility.  He conceived of the consumer as 
“servile, self-indulgent, indolent, ignorant.”
45
  “[T]he great social-economic troubles,” Brandeis 
contended, “arise from the fact [that] the consumer has failed absolutely to perform his function . 




Yet Brandeis saw the untrammeled market not as a cure but rather as a different species 
of the same disease.  Indeed, Brandeis’s contempt for the consumer mirrored that of libertarians 
for the lifeless subject of the welfare and regulatory state.  Both of these characters are weak-
willed and feeble-minded, passive and complacent.  Their faculties atrophy as distant 
superintendents deprive them of agency.  For libertarians, those superintendents are the 
bureaucrats who preside over the political domain.  For Brandeis, by contrast, they are the quasi-
oligarchs who lorded over the realm of commerce.  “The relations between rival railroad 
systems,” Brandeis maintained, “are like the relations between neighboring kingdoms.  The 




It must be stressed that Brandeis never conceived of government as a panacea for the 
scourge of economic concentration.  To the contrary, Brandeis understood that government was 
as vulnerable to the perils of centralization as was business.  Without limits on its size and scope, 
government would engender the same upward shift in power and responsibility that characterized 
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  Still, Brandeis believed in the power of government to arrest and 
even to reverse the tide of consumerism and centralization.  He believed, that is, in the capacity 
of government to resist the spiritual and psychological degradation wrought by the unbridled 
market.  For Brandeis, one of government’s most formidable tools for achieving this objective 
lay in its power to enact and enforce antitrust law.  
 d. Government as a Cudgel: Antitrust and the Fight Against Centralization 
 
If economic centralization empowered an elite few while relegating the mass of citizens 
to the passive activity of consumption, Brandeis sought a corrective in the welfare and regulatory 
state.  Far from subverting the spirit of the producer, government could sustain that spirit against 
the pressures of a consumer economy.  The power of the purse, for instance, stood among 
government’s most powerful devices for preserving small-scale enterprise.  To impose limits on 
corporate size, Brandeis argued for heavy taxation of large corporations.
49
  He embraced a 
progressive income tax to ensure that the nation’s wealth—and, by extension, its productive 
capacity—did not become the exclusive property of an economic elite.
50
  He favored high rates 
of taxation for estates and bequests to prevent the intergenerational perpetuation of wealth.
51
  
“By taxation bigness can be destroyed,” Brandeis declared.  “The power is there: what we create 
we can destroy.”
52
  For Brandeis, taxation designed to thwart the scourge of bigness did not 
threaten freedom.  To the contrary, such taxation safeguarded freedom against the dangers of 
centralized production.   
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Brandeis’s willingness to wield the power of the purse as a cudgel against the curse of 
bigness reveals much about his conception of government and its role in preserving the 
conditions for freedom.  Yet Brandeis left a more enduring legacy in the field of antitrust, and it 
is here that his aversion to consumerism and economic centralization comes into sharpest relief.  
As the architect of Woodrow Wilson’s “New Freedom” domestic agenda, Brandeis left an 
indelible imprint on antitrust policy in the United States.
53
   
The first major attempt at antitrust policy in the United States came in 1890, with the 
passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
54
  Brandeis knew well that the Sherman Act had proved 
toothless in the face of growing economic concentration.
55
  The Sherman Act prohibited only 
“concerted activities” in restraint of trade—that is, it covered collusion between companies, but 
it did not reach the actions of a single enterprise, save for those that gave rise to outright 
monopoly.
56
  This gap in the Act’s scope touched off a wave of corporate mergers and 
acquisitions, as companies sought to do as a single entity what they were barred from doing as 
separate businesses acting in concert.
57
  The Act’s proscription of monopolies and attempts at 
monopoly provided some check on this process.  Short of monopoly, however, businesses could 
engage in anticompetitive behavior with impunity, provided they operated under the protective 
awning of a single entity.
58
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The Act was diluted, moreover, by conservative courts that pounced on the Act’s 
loopholes and ambiguities.  In particular, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sherman 
Act proscribed only “unreasonable” activity in restraint of trade, a penumbra the trusts exploited 
to great profit.
59
  By the time of Woodrow Wilson’s election in 1912, the need for reform was 
clear.  In crafting Wilson’s “New Freedom” domestic platform—and in developing the principle 
of “regulated competition”—Brandeis helped lay the intellectual foundation for the Clayton 
Antitrust Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act.
60
 
The Clayton Act enlarged the Sherman Act’s narrow focus on collusion and forbade 
anticompetitive practices more generally—even those of a single entity acting in isolation.
61
  It 
went beyond the Sherman Act’s prohibition of monopoly, barring mergers and acquisitions that 
“substantially lessen[ed] competition[,]” even where the anti-competitive effects fell short of 
outright monopoly.
62
  For its part, the Federal Trade Commission Act established the Federal 
Trade Commission, the enforcement arm of Wilson’s newly invigorated antitrust regime.
63
  The 
Act empowered the Commission to investigate anticompetitive practices and to enforce the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts.
64
  The Commission wielded unprecedented investigative and 
enforcement authority, and it was Brandeis’s imprimatur that ultimately persuaded Wilson to 
forge ahead with the agency without cabining its broad powers.
65
 
Brandeis’s antitrust policy had definite utilitarian aims.  It aimed to prevent price fixing, 
anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions, and other forms of collusion and concentration that 
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enriched big business at the expense of the consuming public.
66
  But the core objective of 
Brandeis’s antitrust policy was a more elevated one.  For Brandeis, the overriding aim of 
antitrust policy was to combat centralization and preserve the conditions under which individuals 
could act as their own masters.  Only under such conditions could the psychological and spiritual 
health of humanity be maintained.  “[F]ar more serious than even than the suppression of 
competition is the suppression of industrial liberty, indeed of manhood itself, which this 
overweening financial power entails[,]” Brandeis wrote.  “Its blighting and benumbing effect 
extends as well to the small and seemingly independent business man, to the vast army of 
professional men and others directly dependent upon ‘Big Business,’ and to many another.”
67
  In 
practical terms, countering this “blighting and benumbing effect” meant an antitrust policy aimed 
at replacing the pliant consumer with the self-sustaining small businessman.   
 It is worth emphasizing that Brandeis fashioned his antitrust policies to advance the 
interests of consumers and small businessmen alike.  The argument here is simply that, when 
those interests clashed, Brandeis elevated the intrepid small businessman over the inert 
consumer.
68
  Understanding this hierarchy within Brandeis’s political and economic thought is 
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crucial to comprehending his notion of freedom.  For it helps to underscore Brandeis’s 
conception of freedom as a matter of self-creation and self-ownership—ideals that were not 
always compatible with the demands of aggregate utility and material prosperity.  It also helps, 
as such, to highlight cleavages within Progressivism that came to the fore in the presidential 
election of 1912.   
 e. The New Freedom: The Election of 1912 and the Struggle Within Progressivism 
 
 The presidential election of 1912 shone a light on fissures within the Progressive 
Movement.  As a pivotal advisor to Democratic candidate Woodrow Wilson, Brandeis helped 
define the fault lines separating Wilson from Theodore Roosevelt, standard-bearer for the 
Progressive or “Bull Moose” Party.  For Brandeis, the contest hinged on the division between 
“regulated competition” and “regulated monopoly.”  The Brandeisian-Wilsonian policy of 
“regulated competition” aimed to dismantle the great trusts and to prevent them from ever 
emerging again.  It sought, in characteristic Brandeisian fashion, to preserve a small-unit 
economy.
69
  Roosevelt, by contrast, preferred not to upend the great trusts but rather to harness 
their potential through vigorous regulatory oversight.  Brandeis derided the Rooseveltian 
approach as “regulated monopoly.”  “The issue is not . . . Shall we have unrestricted competition 
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The campaign pitted Wilson’s “New Freedom,” of which Brandeis was the chief 
architect, against Roosevelt’s “New Nationalism.”
71
  This dichotomy was more than mere 
campaign fodder.  For it encapsulated a philosophical divide that helps illuminate the singularity 
of Brandeis’s vision of freedom.  For Brandeis, Roosevelt’s attempts to secure the advantages of 
corporate bigness while containing its excesses were doomed to failure.
72
  More significantly, the 
Rooseveltian model of heavy regulation to check big business was incompatible with freedom.  
“This difference in the economic policy of the two parties is fundamental and irreconcilable,” 
Brandeis wrote to Wilson.  “It is the difference between industrial liberty and industrial 
absolutism.”
73
   
 On Brandeis’s account, the supposed efficiencies of corporate bigness were illusory, 
rooted in an inflated conception of human capabilities.  Excessive size meant a loss of human 
control.  This was true, according to Brandeis, of mammoth corporations and sprawling 
government bureaucracies alike.
74
  The Rooseveltian approach to antitrust rested on the notion 
that a powerful regulatory apparatus could counterbalance the great trusts, checking their power 
without relinquishing their vaunted efficiencies.  For Brandeis, however, concentrated economic 
power could no more be tamed than could concentrated political power.  Such power could only 
be destroyed.  “There is no way to safeguard people against despotism except to prevent 
despotism[,]” Brandeis insisted.  “There is no way to safeguard the people from the evils of a 
private . . . monopoly except to prevent the monopoly.”
75
  Nor was there any guarantee that 
regulatory bureaucracies would remain under the stewardship of public-spirited reformers.  They 
                                                        
71
 See Strum, Brandeis: Beyond Progressivism, 83. 
72
 See Brandeis On Democracy, 118-19.  
73
 Ibid., 111.   
74
 See Brandeis On Democracy, 9. 
75
 Strum, Brandeis: Beyond Progressivism, 19.  
 23 
were just as likely to fall prey to industry actors and their political allies.  “[D]o not pin too much 
faith in legislation,” Brandeis admonished.  “Remedial institutions are apt to fall under the 
control of the enemy and to become instruments of oppression.”
76
  Plainly, Brandeis understood 
the danger of what political scientists would later characterize as “agency capture.”  
Popular control of institutions was important to Brandeis’s conception of freedom, for it 
spoke to the capacity of individuals and communities to marshal both public and private 
institutions to their own ends.  But an undue emphasis on divisions over institutional size and 
effectiveness obscures deeper cleavages between the Wilsonians and the Rooseveltians—
cleavages that go to the relative positions of freedom and prosperity within a larger hierarchy of 
contending values.   For Brandeis, freedom was the transcendent value—the good to which all 
other goods, including prosperity, were subordinate.  Brandeis made this hierarchy manifest 
during a debate with Samuel Gompers, founder of the American Federation of Labor: 
Mr. Gompers quoted some time ago the saying of Heine that ‘Bread is Freedom.’  
The ancient Greeks, recognizing that ‘Man cannot live by bread alone,’ declared 
that ‘Leisure is freedom.’  Undoubtedly ‘A full dinner pail’ is a great achievement 
as compared with an empty one, but no people ever did or ever can attain a 
worthy civilization by the satisfaction merely of material needs, however high 
these needs are raised . . . .  Our education and condition of life must be such as 
become a ruler.  Our great beneficent experiment in democracy will fail unless the 
people, our rulers, are developed in character and intelligence.
77
   
 
This is not to contend that the Rooseveltians were indifferent to freedom, either in its 
physical or in its spiritual and psychological manifestations.  It is merely to assert that freedom 
did not occupy the same exalted place in Rooseveltian Progressivism that it did in Brandeisian 
thought.
78
  “Our is a program of liberty[,]” argued Wilson.  “[T]heirs is a program of 
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  While Brandeis clung to the Jeffersonian ideal of an independent, self-sustaining 
citizenry, the Rooseveltians heralded the burgeoning consumer economy of the early 20th 
century, with its unprecedented capacity to produce and distribute goods on a mass scale.
80
  The 
Rooseveltians believed, moreover, that the efficiencies of large-scale commercial enterprise had 
paved the way for this new abundance.
81
   
 For the Rooseveltians, the task of government was not to dismantle this wellspring of 
prosperity in the hope of reviving a moribund ideal of personal independence.  Rather, the 
function of government was to ensure that the great trusts, rather than enrich an economic elite, 
fostered the common good.  The Brandeisian call to dissolve the great trusts seemed to 
Rooseveltian Progressives a needless reversion to a less prosperous past—a quaint anachronism 
at best.  At worst, Brandeis’s embrace of the small unit in both politics and economics impeded 
the march toward a great and modern society.
82
   
 For the Rooseveltians, the Brandeisian-Wilsonian program meant jettisoning the grand 
economies of scale that spurred economic growth, undercutting the purchasing power of large 
distributors whose leverage over manufacturers drove down the price of consumer goods, and 
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taxing large but productive businesses out of existence.
83
  This seemed a high price to pay to 
exhume the spirit of Jefferson.  For Brandeis, however, it was a price worth paying.  The task, as 
such, was to reinvigorate the Jeffersonian ideal of the independent small producer.  Brandeis 
found his vessel for this task in the small businessman.   
 f. The Freedom of the Small Businessman 
 
Brandeis insisted that the maintenance of a small-unit economy accorded with the 
utilitarian aim of promoting material well-being.
84
  Brandeis recognized, however, that freedom 
and prosperity were distinct goods—interwoven, to be sure, but nonetheless distinct.  Prosperity 
depended on the free exercise of the creative faculties, just as freedom depended on a basic 
measure of prosperity.  But Brandeis saw the potential for a collision between freedom and 
prosperity.  In 1916, in a lecture titled “The Living Law,” he outlined the basic tension:  
[W]hile invention and discovery created the possibility of releasing men and 
women from the thraldom of drudgery, there actually came with the introduction 
of the factory system and the development of the business corporation, new 
dangers to liberty.  Large publicly owned corporations replaced small privately 
owned concerns.  Ownership of the instruments of production passed from the 
workman to the employer.  Individual personal relations between the proprietor 
and his help ceased.  The individual contract of service lost its character, because 
of the inequality in position between employer and employee.  The group relation 
of employee to employer, with collective bargaining, became common; for it was 
essential to the workers’ protection.
85
   
 
Ultimately, if freedom required spiritual and psychological vitality, it meant safeguarding a 
sphere of autonomy within which individuals could act as their own masters.  That, in turn, 
meant preserving small-scale enterprise.  If, however, prosperity meant cheap and abundant 
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consumer goods, it entailed the economies of scale, the enhanced bargaining power, and the 
surplus capital that, in the view of the Rooseveltians, only large-scale enterprise could provide.
86
 
The interests of the small business, as such, did not always align with those of consumers. 
The demands of freedom did not always accord with those of material prosperity.  For Brandeis, 
the untrammeled market stood not as a force for liberation, but rather as a system of centralized 
production and mass consumption, corrosive both to the small business and to the ideal of 
freedom it embodied.
87
  It fell to government to right the balance between the consumer and the 
small enterprise.  In Brandeisian thought, government stood as the handmaiden of the 
independent enterprise, from small manufacturing or retail concerns to the craftsmen and artisans 
who had long populated the petite bourgeoisie.  “The inequality between the great corporations 
with huge resources and the small competitor . . . is such that ‘equality before the law’ will no 
longer be secured merely by supplying adequate machinery for enforcing the law[,]” Brandeis 
asserted.  “To prevent oppression and injustice the Government must be prepared to lend its 
aid.”
88
  In this role, government helped to resist the tide of centralized production and mass 
consumption and to preserve the vitality of the independent proprietor. 
Nowhere was Brandeis’s conception of government as an ally of small business more 
apparent than in his approach to antitrust regulation.  Indeed, Brandeis envisaged the Federal 
Trade Commission not as the custodian of a consumer society but rather as a vehicle for 
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strengthening small-scale enterprise.  “We shall erect a great bulwark against the trusts,” 
Brandeis maintained, “when we thus offer to the small business man what is procurable only by 
the great industrial concerns through their research laboratories and bureaus of information.”
89
  
The Commission, he hoped, would serve as a forum in which small concerns could pool 
information and resources in an effort to counter the power of the great trusts.
90
  For the 
Rooseveltian Progressives, the function of government was to harness the power of the trusts for 
the benefit of the consuming public.  For Brandeis, by contrast, the role of government was to 
destroy the trusts and to nurture the modest, independent enterprise.
91
   
This willingness to sacrifice the consumer to the small businessman came into focus in 
battles over the ability of big business to slash prices in an effort to force competitors out of a 
market.  Brandeis was deeply troubled by the ability of large distributors and wholesalers to 
command substantial discounts from manufacturers.
92
  Such discounts were ostensibly a boon to 
consumers, since the savings would in theory be passed onto them in the form of lower prices.
93
 
 But Brandeis understood that the market power of big business, however advantageous to the 
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consumer, doomed smaller firms that could not keep pace with their larger competitors.
94
  The 
retail department store, for example, promised unprecedented access to consumer goods once 
considered luxuries.  But it also crowded out smaller retailers whose limited resources and 
market power placed them at a fatal disadvantage.
95
    
For many of Brandeis’s Progressive contemporaries, the demise of the small retailer was 
a natural incident of economic progress.  Even Wilson, whom Brandeis eventually converted to 
his crusade against corporate bigness, once extolled big business for “adding so enormously to 
the economy and efficiency of the nation’s productive work” and characterized the great trusts as 
“the most convenient and efficient instrumentalities of modern business.”
96
  For Brandeis, 
however, the decline of small business augured a slide into industrial despotism, with wealth and 
power concentrated in an ever-shrinking elite.  He was determined, as such, to stop the practice 
of price slashing and to gird independent businesses against the rising pressures of the market.  
During a congressional hearing for a price-fixing bill that he helped craft, Brandeis called 
for prohibiting the quantity discounts that were the lifeblood of the “capitalistic combinations—
the mail-order houses, existing chains of stores, and the large department stores.”
97
  Thomas K. 
McCraw gives a sense of just how heterodox was Brandeis’s proposal: 
The only reason department stores could undersell their smaller competitors, 
Brandeis went on to say, was that they bought in bulk and availed themselves of 
quantity discounts.  This practice, he told the committee, gave an unfair advantage 
to large retailers and therefore should be stopped.  Here Congressman Alben 
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Barkley of Kentucky, knowing that quantity discounts were as old as business 
itself, could not believe he had heard Brandeis correctly.  But Brandeis remained 
adamant: he predicted that quantity discounts, being ‘fraught with very great evil,’ 




That Brandeis could maintain a position so at odds with economic orthodoxy attested to the 
relative positions of freedom and prosperity within Brandeis’s larger hierarchy of values.  “For 
Brandeis and his allies,” McCraw observes, “to be simultaneously against bigness and for 
consumers was extremely difficult.”
99
  Brandeis was against bigness before he was for 
consumers; he cherished freedom over prosperity.  As McCraw argues, “to the extent that 
consumers voted with their pocketbooks for department stores and mail-order houses, the fight 
against these large retailers became a fight against consumers as well.”
100
 
 Brandeis’s opposition to consumerism and economic centralization upended the duality 
that equated freedom with the market and government with constraint.  Without regulated 
competition, Brandeis argued, the market gave rise to corporate behemoths that stamped out 
smaller competitors.  Size meant greater resources and enhanced market power.  The 
independent enterprise tended to buckle under these competitive pressures, opting either to 
combine with competitors or to close up shop.
101
  In theory, the giant firms that survived would 
pass the benefits of large-scale enterprise onto consumers—provided, that is, that they were 
effectively regulated on the Rooseveltian model.  But the demise of the independent shop meant 
increasing economic centralization, which, in turn, hastened the transition from a producer to a 
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consumer society.  The sturdy entrepreneur gave way to the pliant employee; the vital producer 
degenerated into the inert consumer.  “[Brandeis] opposed the trusts not only because they were 
inefficient but because they were also inhuman[,]” writes Philippa Strum.  “They . . . turned 
people into automatons rather than human beings with the leisure to fulfill and educate 
themselves.”
102
  For Brandeis, no manner of prosperity could justify such a devolution.   
This is not to say that Brandeis believed that a decentralized economy injured the 
consumer.  For Brandeis, vigorous competition between independent enterprises that genuinely 
cared about the integrity of their products furthered the long-term interests of the consumer.
103
  
Brandeis thus avoided any direct confrontation with the trade-off between consumer prosperity 
and the maintenance of independent enterprise.  There can be little doubt, however, that his 
sympathy lay chiefly with the small businessman and not with the consumer.
104
   
Brandeis’s desire to ally government to small business manifested itself in his efforts to 
persuade Congress to exempt small retailers and manufacturers from antitrust restrictions.  Large 
retailers and distributors had long leveraged their market power to drive hard bargains with 
smaller manufacturers.  This, in turn, squeezed those manufacturers to the point of collapse.
105
  
Small retailers, lacking the market power of their larger competitors, could not compete with the 
latter’s cut-rate prices.
106
  This downward pressure on prices forced small retailers and 
manufacturers to shut down or to merge with other firms.  “Some avenue of escape must be 
sought by them,” Brandeis argued, “and it may be found in combination. . . .  The process of 
exterminating the small independent retailer already hard pressed by capitalistic combinations—
                                                        
102
 Strum, Louis D. Brandeis: Justice for the People, 151.  
103
 See Strum, Brandeis: Beyond Progressivism, 85.  
104
 See McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, 103-07. 
105
 See Ibid., 101-08 
106
 See Ibid. 
 31 
the mail-order houses, existing chains of stores, and the large department stores—would be 
greatly accelerated by such a movement.”
107
  For Brandeis, the business itself was not the sole 
casualty here.  The ideal of the autonomous entrepreneur, free to exercise his creativity and 
ingenuity in the marketplace, fell victim to economic concentration as well.  Brandeis feared that 
the vibrancy and self-sufficiency of the artisan and the independent tradesman were devolving 
into the sterility and servility of the wage laborer and the consumer.
108
   
If small retailers and manufacturers were to arrest the trend toward consolidation, they 
had to stand in solidarity against their larger competitors.  Without the fetters of antitrust law, 
small retailers and manufacturers could pool information about prices, profits, and negotiations 
with distributors.  To counter the might of the great trusts, independent firms could agree not to 
sell to distributors or to consumers below a given price.  Brandeis distinguished such “price 
maintenance” from the practice of “price cutting.”
109
  The corporate goliaths engaged in price 
cutting—that is, slashing prices to undercut smaller competitors and force them out of the 
market.  For Brandeis, price cutting was “the most potent weapon of monopoly—a means of 
killing the small rival to which the great trusts have resorted most frequently.”
110
   
Cooperation among independent firms, by contrast, aimed at price maintenance—that is, 
the fixing of prices that allowed small businesses to survive.  “The prohibition of price 
maintenance,” Brandeis contended, “imposes upon the small and independent producers a 
serious handicap.”
111
  Price cutting had to do with raw market power.  Price maintenance aimed 
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at fair compensation for the blood, sweat, and tears that went into a small business.
112
  The 
distinction was that between “a manufacturer fixing the retail selling price of an article of his 
own creation and to which he has imparted his reputation, and the fixing of prices by a monopoly 
or by a combination tending to monopoly.”
113
  
Such coordination between small enterprises was illegal under the antitrust laws that 
Brandeis himself had championed.  But Brandeis did not oppose such practices in principle.  
Rather, he opposed them when they yielded consolidation and centralization.  When they 
advanced his ideal of the independent small enterprise, he thought them indispensable.  He 
sought, as such, to “stimulate[], through the fixed price, the little man as against the department 
store, and as against the large unit which may otherwise monopolize that trade.”
114
  If, moreover, 
preventing price cutting entailed harm to the consumer, such was simply the cost of preserving 
industrial freedom.
115
   
Ultimately, small retailers and manufacturers remained within the ambit of the antitrust 
laws.  But it is important to understand what Brandeis’s efforts to exempt small businesses from 
antitrust restrictions revealed about his vision of government.  For Brandeis, government was 
more than the disinterested referee or “night watchman” that appears in the libertarian 
conception of the state.  Government was not a neutral observer in the struggle between the small 
businessman and the economic goliaths that produced a deadening melange of wage laborers, 
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middle managers, and corporate executives.
116
  To the contrary, Brandeis marshaled the power of 
government to elevate small-scale enterprise and to hamstring the corporate titans that stifled 
economic freedom.  In championing the ideal of the independent enterprise against the forces of 
economic concentration, government acted as a weapon against economic servitude and as a 
force for human liberation.  This was an affirmative, rather than a negative, conception of the 
state—and it was a vision of government as an organ of freedom rather than of constraint.   
In that same vein, the powers to tax and to regulate appear in Brandeis’s thought not as 
tools of oppression but rather as means of emancipation from the tyranny of unfettered 
capitalism.  Brandeis’s dissent in Lee v. Liggett is particularly instructive.  In the course of 
defending a Florida law that imposed heavier license fees on chain stores than on independent 
businesses, Brandeis enunciated his conception of government as the handmaiden of freedom: 
There is a widespread belief that . . . by the control which the few have exerted 
through giant corporations individual initiative and effort are being paralyzed, 
creative power impaired and human happiness lessened; that the true prosperity of 
our past came not from big business, but through the courage, the energy, and the 
resourcefulness of small men; that only by releasing from corporate control the 
faculties of the unknown many, only by reopening to them the opportunities for 
leadership, can confidence in our future be restored and the existing misery be 
overcome; and that only through participation by the many in the responsibilities 
and determinations of business can Americans secure the moral and intellectual 




This passage reflects the same preoccupation with mind and spirit that courses through 
libertarian thought.  But where libertarians warn against the enfeebling tendencies of the welfare 
and regulatory state, Brandeis saw government as a means of fortifying the human psyche 
against the enervating influence of untrammeled capitalism. 
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The thrust of Brandeis’s argument in Lee was not that mammoth corporations thwarted 
the individual’s pursuit of material well-being.  Brandeis’s emphasis in Lee lay instead with the 
condition of the human psyche and spirit.  “Giant corporations,” Brandeis averred, were sapping 
the vim and vigor of a free mind and spirit—the “individual initiative and effort” that 
unrestrained capitalism had “paralyzed.”
118
  “[T]he courage, the energy, the resourcefulness of 
small men” were the human properties that Brandeis most cherished, and these were antithetical 
to the servility and passivity inherent in the twin ills of consumerism and economic 
centralization.
119
  “[O]nly by releasing from corporate control the faculties of the unknown 
many,” Brandeis believed, could the human mind and spirit remain vital.
120
   
For Brandeis, the ideal of the small businessman promised to deliver mind and spirit from 
the clutches of “corporate control.”
121
  Only in small economic units could “the unknown many” 
seize the “opportunities for leadership” that were “essential to the maintenance of liberty.”
122
  In 
Lee, Brandeis traces a through line that structures the entire body of his political and economic 
thought: responsibility drives maturation, which, in turn, undergirds freedom.  For Brandeis, the 
unbridled market stunted this process.  By denying to “small men” “participation in the 
responsibilities and determinations of business,” the unregulated market subverted freedom.
123
  
The remedy, Brandeis contended, lay with a system of regulated competition in which 
government ensured both that the aspiring entrepreneur could thrive and that enterprises 
remained small enough for workers themselves to share in the “responsibilities and 
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  Only then could the “unknown many” achieve the “moral and 
intellectual development which is essential to the maintenance of liberty.”
125
 
The irony of Brandeis’s contest with the champions of laissez-faire capitalism was that 
both drew in some measure from the same intellectual well.  In particular, both claimed to be 
carrying forward the legacy of the American Founding.  “Those who won our independence,” 
Brandeis proclaimed in dissent in Whitney v. California, “believed that the final end of the State 
was to make men free to develop their faculties . . . .  They valued liberty both as an end and as a 
means.  They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of 
liberty.”
126
  But where proponents of laissez faire insisted on strict adherence to the letter of the 
Constitution, Brandeis sought to revivify the spirit of the Founding in the light of the 20th 
century.
127
   
For Brandeis, reflexive enforcement of contract and property rights eroded the ideal of 
freedom.  Rigid application of Founding Era maxims had to give way to a dynamic adaptation of 
the Founding spirit.
128
  What, then, were the Founding ideals that Brandeis sought to resurrect for 
a new age?  They were the ideals of Jeffersonian democracy, and with those ideals came a vision 
of freedom grounded not in capitalism but in notions of self-ownership and self-realization.  A 
discussion of those ideals follows, with the aim both of locating Brandeis’s vision of freedom in 
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a larger political tradition and of reaching a clearer understanding of its historical and conceptual 
roots.  
 g. Echoes of Jefferson 
 
In Brandeis’s vision of the sturdy and independent small businessman, there was an 
unmistakable echo of Jefferson’s ideal of the yeoman farmer.
129
  In his political and economic 
thought, Brandeis sought to adapt Jeffersonianism to the 20th century.  As Harold Laski 
remarked in 1922, “[Brandeis] is really a Jeffersonian Democrat, trying to use the power of the 
State to enforce an environment in which competition may be really free and equal.”
130
  But 
Brandeis encountered obstacles with which Jefferson did not need to contend.
131
  In Jefferson’s 
18th century Virginia, arable land was plentiful, and a society of modestly prosperous 
freeholders was in reach.
132
  According to Jefferson, how the fledgling republic harnessed its 
bounteous frontier would determine the long-term survival of the ideals of the American 




In Jefferson’s vision of an agrarian society, the freeholder-farmer depended not on the 
goodwill of bosses and factory owners but rather on his own initiative and ingenuity.
134
  The 
yeoman farmer answered only to his own conscience.  For Jefferson, this spirit of independence 
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meant the difference between a free and virtuous citizenry and a people in the throes of moral 
degeneration:  
Those who labour in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a 
chosen people, whose breasts he has made his peculiar deposit for substantial and 
genuine virtue.  It is the focus in which he keeps alive that sacred fire, which 
otherwise might escape from the face of the earth.  Corruption of morals in the 
mass of cultivators is a phaenomenon [sic] of which no age nor nation has 
furnished an example.  It is the mark set on those, who not looking up to heaven, 
to their own soil and industry, as does the husbandman, for their subsistence, 
depend for it on the casualties and caprice of customers.  Dependance [sic] begets 
subservience and venality, suffocates the germ of virtue, and prepares fit tools for 




Jefferson held an abiding faith in the liberating power of property ownership.
136
  This faith lay 
beneath his proposal to enshrine in the Virginia Constitution a guarantee of fifty acres of land to 
every white male of majority age in the Commonwealth of Virginia.  This proposal revealed as 
much about his vision of freedom as did his vaunted prose in the Declaration of Independence.
137
   
Jefferson’s belief in the emancipating potential of broad-based land ownership emerged 
again in 1803, when then President Jefferson purchased the territory of Louisiana from 
Napoleon.  Jefferson doubted whether the acquisition comported with the Constitution, worrying 
that the massive land purchase both stretched the power of the executive and clashed with his 
philosophy of narrowly construing the powers granted to the federal government under the 
Constitution.
138
  But Jefferson hoped that the Louisiana Purchase would lay the foundation for a 
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nation of independent landowners, and that vision ultimately trumped Jefferson’s preferred mode 
of constitutional interpretation.
139
  Like Brandeis, Jefferson saw freedom in substantive, rather 
than in formal, terms.  Just as Brandeis elevated self-determination for workers and small 
businessmen over adherence to “laissez- faire” economics, so too did Jefferson subordinate 
“strict constructionism” to his vision of a free society.
140
   For both Jefferson and Brandeis, rigid 
adherence to philosophical formulae was no substitute for real, flesh-and-blood freedom.  
Jefferson’s pastoral idyll collided with Alexander Hamilton’s vision of an industrial 
society rooted in manufacturing, with power residing not in the open countryside but in the 
congested urban centers that were the breeding grounds for an emerging capitalist economy.
141
 
 “I am savage enough,” Jefferson wrote, “to prefer the woods, the wilds, and the independence of 
Monticello, to all the brilliant pleasures of this gay capital.  I shall therefore rejoin myself to my 
native country with new attachments, with exaggerated esteem for its advantages, for tho’ there 
is less wealth there, there is more freedom, more ease and less misery.”
142
  Here, Jefferson offers 
an earlier iteration of Brandeis’s insight that wealth and freedom were not merely distinct goods; 
they were potentially conflicting ones as well.  “I don’t want money or property most,” Brandeis 
explained, echoing Jefferson.  “I want to be free.”
143
 
For Jefferson, as for Brandeis, freedom had a spiritual and psychological underpinning, 
and just as Brandeis believed that the twin evils of consumerism and economic centralization 
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enervated mind and spirit, so too did Jefferson fear that the dual ills of urbanization and 
industrialization would sap human vitality and creativity.  “The mobs of great cities add just so 
much to the support of pure government,” argued Jefferson, “as sores do to the strength of the 
human body.”
144
  The urban wage laborer was the antithesis of Jefferson’s yeoman farmer.  
Where the yeoman farmer relied only on his own labor, the wage laborer depended on the 
goodwill of his employer.  Where the yeoman farmer enjoyed a sphere of autonomy within 
which he was free to determine the pace and character of his labor, the wage laborer executed the 
commands of floor bosses and factory owners.  Where the yeoman farmer lived and labored in 
the wide-open expanse of the countryside, the wage laborer resided in cramped tenements, 
toiling amid the dreary backdrop of urban squalor.  
For Jefferson, the yeoman farmer was free in the physical sense, in that he did not labor 
under the despotism of the floor supervisors and factory owners who ruled the nation’s industrial 
centers.  Like Brandeis, however, Jefferson did not conceive of freedom in purely physical terms.  
For Jefferson, Richard K. Matthews writes, “[m]an was meant to be much more than either a 
mere consumer or an appropriator.”
145
  Jefferson’s yeoman farmer was free in mind and spirit as 
well as in body.  The wage laborer was listless and servile, battered by a life of submission and 
subordination; the yeoman farmer was vigorous and independent, fortified by the experience of 
autonomy and self-reliance.
146
  The world of the yeoman farmer was one of his own making.  
The world of the wage laborer, by contrast, came to him already made.  For Jefferson, as for 
Brandeis, the experience of self-creation vivified the human psyche; to inhabit a world made by 
others and controlled from above enervated mind and spirit.  The yeoman farmer did not 
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passively man an assembly line; he actively harnessed the raw material of existence through his 
powers of creativity and ingenuity.
147
    
Like Jefferson, Brandeis revered the steely men and women who worked the earth.  
Brandeis exalted the self-sustaining farmer whose world sprang not from alien forces but from 
his own hands and mind.  Invoking Scottish philosopher Thomas Carlyle, Brandeis extolled the 
“toil-worn craftsman who conquers the earth and him who is seen toiling for the spiritually 
indispensable.”
148
  But Brandeis’s admiration for the yeoman farmer of Jeffersonian lore 
crystallized not in his vision for America, but rather in the homeland he envisaged for the Jewish 
people in Palestine.  Brandeis saw in Palestine a safe haven for a beleaguered people.  Just as 
significantly, however, he imagined Palestine as a proving ground for Jeffersonianism.
149
   
 h. Tabula Rasas: Brandeisian Experiments in Jeffersonianism 
 
By the 20th century, the United States had transitioned from small-scale agriculture to 
heavy industry.  In the United States, as such, Brandeis did not seek to implement the 
Jeffersonian ideal in its original iteration, for that particular manifestation of the Jeffersonian 
vision was no longer practicable.
150
  Rather, Brandeis sought to adapt Jeffersonianism to 20th 
century conditions.  Those conditions often impeded the task of adaptation.  Large-scale 
capitalism had taken root in America, and Jefferson’s vision of a nation of independent 
freeholders was thus no longer practicable.  Indeed, the challenge of dislodging large-scale 
capitalism and resurrecting a society more in line with Jefferson’s ideal bedeviled Brandeis his 
entire life.  An exchange between Brandeis and his law clerk, Harry Shulman, is instructive: “I 
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suggested to [Brandeis][,]” writes Shulman, “that [limiting the size of corporations by taxation] 
would be . . . attempting to do the impossible, to turn the clock back.  His reaction was 
immediate and spirited: why shouldn’t we turn the clock back?”
151
 
In Brandeis’s mind, Palestine offered not only a refuge for an embattled people but also a 
blank canvass, a pristine landscape into which capitalism had not yet penetrated.  In Palestine, 
land was plentiful, and Brandeis hoped that Jewish settlers would develop the independence and 
self-reliance that Jefferson had envisioned for the yeoman farmer of 18th century America.  In 
Palestine, there were no corporate titans to thwart aspiring enterprises or to entrench a culture of 
mass consumption.  Nor were there large factory owners or floor supervisors before whom 
workers would be forced to grovel.
152
   
For Brandeis, the fact that Palestine was not rich in natural resources was a blessing, as it 
meant that the capitalists who had subverted the Jeffersonian ideal in America would steer clear 
of the Jewish homeland.  Brandeis urged the Zionist movement to resist large-scale industrial 
development—for only if Palestine escaped the rule of capital could Jewish settlers retain their 
material independence, their capacity for self-creation, and their integrity as free people.
153
  For 
Brandeis, Palestine beckoned as a haven from the hierarchy and dependency inherent in large-
scale capitalism.  In Palestine, individuals could nurture the strength of mind and spirit that 
undergirded true freedom.
154
   
Jewish settlement of Palestine was not the only occasion when Brandeis undertook to 
safeguard an experiment in Jeffersonianism against capitalist exploitation.  When the 
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administration of William Howard Taft announced that it would open up the territory of Alaska 
to corporate development, Brandeis condemned the decision and resolved to keep large-scale 
capitalism out of the territory.  Alaska, Brandeis declared, was to be a land not of capitalists and 
wage laborers, but rather of independent citizen-landowners in the Jeffersonian mold.
155
  “How 
would this do for the Progressive slogan,” Brandeis wrote to Progressive champion Robert 
LaFollette, “‘Alaska; the Land of Opportunity.  Develop it by the People, for the People.  Do not 
let it be exploited by the Capitalists, for the Capitalists.’”
156
 
Like the sturdy settlers who sought a Jewish homeland in Palestine, the intrepid souls 
who forged new lives on the Alaskan frontier were not to be servants of capital.  “We are not 
dealing here,” Brandeis averred, “with a question of the conservation of natural resources 
merely: it is the conservation of manhood.”
157
  Alaskans, Brandeis insisted, were to be their own 
masters: 
We must devise some system by which those who are willing to go to Alaska, 
with a view to working there and developing its resources, shall have not only the 
assurance of fair treatment, but the opportunity of operating without undue 
oppression through monopolistically inclined competitors. . . .  In other words, . . . 
the settlers of Alaska should get the increment in value which they earn, through 
their investment and their own labor, and the sacrifices attendant upon settling in 




In Alaska, as in Palestine, Brandeis sought to preserve a sphere within which mind and 
spirit could roam free, unburdened by the hierarchy and congestion of urban life in the United 
States.  He was determined, moreover, to protect that sphere against the enslaving and enervating 
influence of large-scale capitalism: 
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Development of transportation and other facilities by the capitalists would, in a 
way, seriously impair development, because to give them a return which would 
seem to them adequate would entail rates which would be oppressive to the 
people of Alaska, and would, in themselves, tend to retard development and the 
opening up of opportunities to the sturdy, courageous men who are willing to take 
up their residence in the territory.
159
   
 
In Brandeis’s vision for Alaska and Palestine, capitalism did not promote freedom.  To the 
contrary, the untrammeled market subverted freedom.   
In 20th century America, the unsullied frontier had receded, and a landscape cluttered 
with entrenched privileges had emerged in its stead.  Brandeis could not guarantee to every 
American fifty acres of land, as Jefferson had done for white males in Virginia.
160
  Instead, 
Brandeis sought to transpose Jefferson’s 18th century vision of small, autonomous landowners to 
the realities of the 20th century.  For Brandeis, the figure of the independent small businessman 
offered the closest contemporary analogue to the yeoman farmer of Jeffersonian lore.  Like 
Jefferson’s yeoman farmer, the independent small businessman was sovereign within his own 
modest sphere of existence.  The habits of servility and subordination that large-scale enterprise 
had engendered in urban wage laborers were foreign to him.  His were the habits of self-reliance, 
ingenuity, and creativity, the hallmarks of a vibrant mind and spirit.
161
 
What, then, of the majority of Americans who would never become independent artisans, 
shopkeepers, or manufacturers?  How were they to seize control of their lives?  How were they 
to cultivate the vitality of mind and spirit that was essential to true freedom?  Brandeis diagnosed 
the problem thusly: 
Half a century ago, nearly every American boy could look forward to becoming 
independent as a farmer or mechanic, in business or professional life . . . .  Today 
most American boys have reason to believe that throughout life they will work in 
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some capacity as employees of others, either in private or public business; and a 
large percentage of women occupy like positions.
162
   
 
The solution, Brandeis believed, lay in “industrial democracy.” 
IV. FREEDOM OF THE DEMOS 
 a. Reinvigorating Jefferson’s Ward Republic 
 
 Libertarians have long been ambivalent about democracy.  As Hayek explained: 
We have no intention . . . of making a fetish of democracy.  It may well be true 
that our generation talks and thinks too much of democracy and too little of the 
values which it serves. . . .  Democracy is essentially a means, a utilitarian device 
for safeguarding internal peace and individual freedom.   As such it is by no 
means infallible or certain.  Nor must we forget that there has often been much 
more cultural and spiritual freedom under an autocratic rule than under some 




The struggle of the individual against the collective—of the brilliant and creative iconoclast 
against the unthinking and destructive masses—has surfaced time and again as a motif in 
libertarian thought.  “[T]he revolt of the individual against the species,”  Hayek declared, “was 
indeed the force which built our civilization.”
164
  
 This opposition between the individual and the collective maps neatly onto the equation 
of capitalism with freedom and government with constraint.
165
  For libertarians, the untrammeled 
market embodies the heroic spirit of the individual and guards against the tyranny of the mob.  
Prior to the spread of free markets, Hayek argued, “the beliefs of the great majority on what was 
right and proper were allowed to bar the way of the individual innovator.”
166
  The state, by 
contrast, represents the triumph of the collective over the individual, the smothering of 
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individuality by a crushing uniformity.  “The characteristic feature of action through political 
channels is that it tends to require or enforce substantial conformity[,]” wrote libertarian 
economist Milton Friedman.  “The great advantage of the market, on the other hand, is that it 
permits wide diversity.”
167
  In this contest between the individual and the collective, the 
individual embodies the spirit of freedom.  The collective oppresses that spirit.  As Hayek wrote: 
If the “community” or the state are prior to the individual, if they have ends of 
their own independent of and superior to those of . . . individuals, only those 
individuals who work for the same ends can be regarded as members of the 
community.  It is a necessary consequence of this view that a person is respected 
only as a member of the group, that is, only if and in so far as he works for the 
recognized common ends, and that he derives his whole dignity only from this 




Brandeis discerned no such antagonism between the individual and the community.  “The 
right of development on the part of the group is essential to the full enjoyment of rights by the 
individual,” he insisted.  “We can scarcely conceive of an individual German or Frenchman 
living and developing without some relation to the contemporary German or French life and 
culture.”
169
  The logic of Brandeis’s argument here is that self-determination is both a collective 
and an individual right, for “the individual is dependent for his development (and his happiness) 
in large part upon the development of the group of which he forms a part.”
170
  For Brandeis, 
individual freedom was therefore inseparable from democracy.  Government, in turn, stood as an 
organ for expressing the will of the demos and thus as an instrument of both individual and 
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  “The goal,” writes Strum, “was the individual; the method was the 
organized community; the two were inextricably connected.”
172
  Unrestrained capitalism, by 
contrast, produced atomized workers in thrall to their employers and left the wider public 
subordinate to a few industrialists and financiers. 
For Brandeis, the ultimate purpose of a society—the end to which all of society’s other 
functions were but means—was the fullest possible development of the individual.
173
  Material 
well-being and freedom of action were prerequisites for such development, but these were only 
the means to a more elevated condition of mind and spirit.  This more exalted conception of 
freedom entailed individual self-actualization, but it also rested on a notion of man as a “social 
animal,” in Aristotelian terms.  “Brandeis regarded democratic government as necessary,” Strum 
writes, “because, without it, human fulfillment was impossible.”
174
  
This conception of individual freedom as inextricable from the maintenance of a vibrant 
demos underlay Brandeis’s vision for a Jewish homeland.  Brandeis imagined Palestine as a land 
where the individual would enjoy a sphere of autonomy.
175
  Equally important, however, 
Brandeis conceived of Palestine as a project to revive the bonds between the individual and the 
community.  The vulgar commercialism of large-scale capitalism had eroded those connective 
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threads; in Palestine, Brandeis hoped to restore them.
176
  In his vision for Palestine, Brandeis 
evoked the ideal of the Athenian demos, with its Aristotelian understanding of the individual as a 
social being.
177
  He was particularly enamored of Alfred Zimmern’s The Greek Commonwealth, 
a paean to Athenian democracy that profoundly influenced Brandeis’s conception of the Jewish 
homeland.
178
   
Brandeis abhorred the atomistic individualism espoused by market fundamentalists.  True 
freedom, Brandeis maintained, consisted in the capacity to exercise those sublime faculties that 
made one distinctively human—the faculties of reason and creativity, of self-creation and self-
rule.  In the atomized individual, Brandeis insisted, these faculties would lie fallow.
179
  For man 
to be free not only to live as he desired, but to live as he was meant to live, communion with 
others was essential.  “[The individual’s] development,” Brandeis averred, “is attained mainly in 
the processes of common living.”
180
 
Brandeis’s conception of democracy harked back to Jefferson’s ideal of the “ward 
republic”—a system of communal self-determination built on small political units that 
empowered individuals to influence collective decisions.  As Jefferson described it: 
Divide the counties into wards of such size as that every citizen can attend, when 
called on, and act in person.  Ascribe to them the government of their wants in all 
things relating to themselves exclusively . . . and by making every citizen an 
acting member of the government, and in the offices nearest and most interesting 
to him, will attach him by his strongest feelings to the independence of his 
country, and its republican constitution . . . .  These wards, called townships in 
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New England, are the vital principle of their governments, and have proved 
themselves the wisest invention ever devised by the wit of man for the perfect 




For Brandeis, as for Jefferson, the small political unit was meant to foster a symbiosis between 
the individual and the collective, the one developing in tandem with the other.  This is not to 
argue that either Jefferson or Brandeis favored the submergence of the individual beneath an 
omnipotent collective.  To the contrary, both Jefferson and Brandeis cherished the ideal of the 
autonomous, self-reliant individual.  For Jefferson, as for Brandeis, the maintenance of a private 
domain within which mind and spirit were free to roam, away from the pressures of society, was 
essential to freedom.
182
  “The makers of our Constitution,” Brandeis wrote in dissent in Olmstead 
v. United States, “conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”
183
 
Jefferson feared the specter of majoritarian tyranny.  Like Brandeis, however, Jefferson 
saw no inherent antagonism between the individual and the community.  To the contrary, for 
Jefferson, meaningful freedom—rooted not in the unimpeded pursuit of momentary desires but 
in a more exalted and enduring ideal of self-realization—required participation in communal life.  
“[Jefferson’s] individual was closer to homo civicus than homo oeconomicus[,]” writes political 
theorist Richard K. Matthews.
184
  Jefferson’s yeoman farmer was meant to have a protected 
sphere of autonomy wherein he could be free from outside disturbance.  But he was not meant to 
remain within that sphere.  The idyllic homestead of Jeffersonian lore was a temporary, rather 
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than a permanent, refuge from the public domain, a haven to which the citizen could repair for 
psychological and intellectual nourishment before reengaging in public life.  For Jefferson, the 
private domain was less a shelter from the public domain than it was a training ground for it.
185
  
In this symbiosis between the individual and the community, government functioned as a 
vehicle for participating in public life, as a conduit that connected the parts of a democratic 
polity (i.e., individuals) to the whole (i.e., the community).  Even as the specter of an overgrown 
Leviathan loomed in the thought of both Jefferson and Brandeis, government on a scale that 
permitted robust engagement in political life acted not as an oppressor but as a vessel for 
collective self-determination.  For Jefferson, such a government entailed the protection of state 
sovereignty against the encroachments of federal power.
186
  More fundamentally, though, it 
meant the maintenance of “ward republics,” governing units small enough to permit meaningful 
participation by average citizens.
187
  Jefferson envisaged a society of citizen-legislators 
constantly engaged in the exercise of collective self-determination.
188
   
In exalting states and localities as the political units best-suited to a free society, Brandeis 
echoed Jefferson’s commitment to state sovereignty and the ideal of the ward republic.  Brandeis 
was willing to resort to federal intervention when necessary, but he sought to preserve the 
position of state and local governments as the principal fora for political action.  “[T]he present 
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tendency toward centralization[,]” Brandeis wrote, “must be arrested if we are to attain the 
American ideals, and . . . for it must be substituted intense development of life through activities 
in the several states and localities.”
189
  Indeed, just as Brandeis viewed the small economic unit 
as the foundation of economic freedom, so too did he conceive of the small political unit as the 
underpinning of political freedom.
190
  For Brandeis, as for Jefferson, freedom was inseparable 
from the small unit, whether in the market or in government.
191
  “The [curse of bigness] is 
applicable to government as well as to private business[,]” Brandeis contended.  “Hence beware 
of centralization . . . .”
192
   
The virtue of the small unit was that it gave the average person a voice.  Byzantine 
government bureaucracies and corporate behemoths, by contrast, drowned out the voices of all 
but a privileged few.  “Curb of bigness,” Brandeis asserted, “is indispensable to true Democracy 
and Liberty.  It is the very foundation also of wisdom in things human.”
193
  Here again, the 
connection between freedom and democracy in Jeffersonian-Brandeisian thought crystallizes.  
The small unit undergirded freedom because it fostered self-determination and democratic 
engagement both in politics and in industry.  It is this nexus—where freedom, democracy, and 
the small unit converge—that imparts to the Jeffersonian-Brandeisian worldview its singularity 
within the American political tradition. 
Indeed, it was this distinctive blend that separated Brandeis from the Rooseveltian 
Progressives.  The Rooseveltian Progressives envisioned society as a well-oiled machine.  Utility 
and efficiency were the touchstones for evaluating institutional arrangements; the Good Society, 
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as such, was the society that worked.
194
  For the Rooseveltians, if maximizing social welfare 
meant jettisoning an antiquated attachment to individual autonomy and local control, such was 
the necessary price of modernity.
195
  “Economically and politically the need is for constructive 
regulation,” wrote Herbert Croly, one of the progenitors of the New Nationalism, “implying the 
imposition of certain fruitful limitations upon traditional individual freedom.”
196
  If optimizing 
economic capacity meant entrusting the economy to a cadre of experts insulated from the 
passions of the public, such was the cost of shepherding America into the age of reason.
197
 
 Jefferson and Brandeis, by contrast, conceived of society not as a well-oiled machine but 
rather as the instrument through which individuals both established and expressed their identities 
as free agents.  The Jeffersonian-Brandeisian vision was not one of a glorious modernity shorn of 
all waste and irrationality.  To the contrary, freedom and democracy necessarily bred waste.
198
  
Freedom’s discontents were not the byproducts of man’s failure to keep pace with modernity; 
they were the cost of ideals too precious to sacrifice.  “If in any case we should find that, despite 
the fullest co-operation of employees, . . . reduced working time results in immediate economic 
loss,” Brandeis argued, “the welfare of our democratic community compels us to work 
nevertheless for a reasonably short work day as a condition essential to the making of good 
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  For Brandeis and Jefferson, the Good Society was not the society that worked in the 
utilitarian sense.  Rather, it was the society that worked to preserve and promote the twin ideals 
of freedom and democracy.
200
   
Freedom and democracy converged in Brandeis’s thought in two respects.  First, 
Brandeis viewed democracy as a source of raw material power, as a weapon for wresting control 
from economic elites.  Second, Brandeis conceived of democracy as a fount of human 
enrichment, as a vessel for self-creation and self-rule that kept the vital citizen from degenerating 
into the pliant subject.  “The greatest menace to freedom,” Brandeis wrote in Whitney v. 
California, “is an inert people.”
201
  I turn now to an examination of these aspects of Brandeis’s 
vision of democracy through the prism of his support for “industrial democracy,” a system of 
worker control that empowered laborers themselves to determine the course of productive 
enterprise.  
 b. Labor Solidarity as Worker Emancipation  
 
Brandeis’s place in the pantheon of American Progressivism tends to obscure the fact that 
he was a convert to the Progressive cause.  When precisely Brandeis’s beliefs shifted is a matter 
of debate.  By his own account, however, the Homestead Strike of 1892 was pivotal to his 
evolution.  “[I]t was the affair at Homestead which first set me to thinking seriously about the 
labor problem,” Brandeis explained.  “It took the shock of that battle, where organized capital 
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hired a private army to shoot at organized labor for resisting an arbitrary cut in wages, to turn my 
mind definitely toward a searching study of the relations of labor to industry.”
202
  For Brandeis, 
Homestead laid bare the coercive power structure that underlay relations between labor and 
capital: 
One morning the newspaper carried the story of the pitched battle between the 
Pinkertons on the barge and barricaded steel workers on the bank.  I saw at once 
that the common law, built up under simpler conditions of living, gave an 
inadequate basis for the adjustment of the complex relations of the modern factory 




Beginning with Homestead, Brandeis came to view unfettered industry as a threat to the freedom 
of workers, and labor solidarity as a means of liberating workers from the clutches of capital. 
The critical moment in the Homestead Strike of 1892 came when the Carnegie Steel 
Company dispatched the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, a mercenary police force, to 
squash a worker uprising.  Dozens were killed or wounded before the fighting ended.  In the 
denouement, strikers returned to their stations with their wages slashed and their power 
diminished.
204
  Homestead was one among many conflagrations that erupted between labor and 
capital in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
 
 But it was typical of such episodes in at least 
one respect: in Homestead, as elsewhere in the country, the law stood decisively in the corner of 
capital.  Conservative courts had long upheld “yellow-dog” contracts—that is, employment 
contracts that barred workers from joining a union—under the legal doctrine of “liberty of 
contract.”
205
  For conservative jurists, freedom meant an inviolable right to enter into commercial 
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transactions.  To deny employers the ability to contract with willing employees on mutually 
agreeable terms was to deprive both of the right to earn a living by their own free exertions.
206
   
This reverence for contractual liberty rested on a simplistic understanding of the power 
relations that drove negotiations between labor and capital.  For conservative jurists, employment 
contracts were expressions of individual freedom.  As such, they were entitled to judicial 
deference.
207
  The “labor injunction,” whereby courts enforced employment contracts by 
ordering an end to strikes, became the standard device by which employers repressed labor 
activism.
208
  Even the Sherman Act of 1890, designed to prevent collusion between large 
corporations, became a weapon of capital, as courts interpreted the act to bar union activity in 
“restraint of trade”—a stinging irony for Progressives, and a reflection of the systemic barriers 
that confronted the labor movement.
209
 
For Brandeis, Homestead—and the broader labor unrest that it represented—illuminated 
the disjuncture between the realities of the industrial age and the illusion of freedom embodied in 
the doctrine of “liberty of contract.”
210
  To begin with, Homestead revealed that coercion—even 
violent coercion—was hardly the exclusive province of the state.  Indeed, Carnegie Steel could 
not have prevailed in Homestead without the might of the Pinkertons behind it.  Nor was such 
repression peculiar to Homestead.  To the contrary, such tactics were widespread.  Historian Eric 
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Foner offers a sense of the pervasiveness and perniciousness of corporate repression during this 
period: 
Beginning in 1936, a Senate subcommittee . . . exposed the methods used by 
employers to combat unionization, including a vast array of spies and private 
police forces.  Workers had “no liberties at all,” an employee of General Motors 
wrote the committee from Saginaw, Michigan.  The extensive violence unleashed 
against strikers in California’s cotton and lettuce fields and canneries made that 
state, the committee report concluded, seem “more like a fascist European 




 The principal form of coercion that underlay relations between labor and capital was less 
flagrant than the violent repression in Homestead, however.  This subtler kind of coercion grew 
out of fear of the destitution that came with unemployment.  The doctrine of “liberty of contract” 
rested on the assumption that the parties to a contract were free to refuse the terms.  For jurists 
committed to that doctrine, contracts reflected negotiations between free counterparties capable 
of assessing whether a given arrangement served their interests.
212
  For Brandeis, this was mere 
fiction.  On the surface, transactions between worker and employer tended not to involve overt 
physical coercion of the sort employed in Homestead.  Beneath the exterior, however, the chasm 
in power between labor and capital created economic pressures no less coercive than guns and 
tear gas.  To refuse employment often meant desperate poverty—particularly where one or two 
firms dominated a market, leaving workers with no real alternative to dismal terms of 
employment.  “[W]e have the situation,” Brandeis averred, “of an employer so potent, so well-
organized, with such concentrated forces and with such extraordinary powers of reserve and the 
ability to endure against strikes and other efforts of a union, that the relatively loosely organized 
masses of even strong unions are unable to cope with the situation.”
213
  The threat of poverty, as 
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such, was a cudgel with which capital battered labor into submission on pay, working conditions, 
and collective bargaining rights. 
Brandeis recognized that poor wages and working conditions were not the free choice of 
workers.  Rather, they were the conditions to which necessity had condemned them.  For 
Brandeis, no one could “be really free who is constantly in danger of becoming dependent for 
mere subsistence upon somebody and something else than his own exertion and conduct.”
214
  
Workers endured abuse on the factory floor because insubordination meant starvation.  This was 
hardly the benign rule of an “invisible hand.”  It was the stranglehold of power incarnate—of 
floor bosses and shift supervisors to whose mood and whim workers were prisoner.  The twin 
doctrines of laissez faire and liberty of contract may have meant self-determination for capital.  
For labor, however, they translated into a form of economic bondage.  “Men are not free,” 
Brandeis contended, “if dependent industrially upon the arbitrary will of another.”
215
     
 For Brandeis, real freedom—as opposed to freedom in the abstract, of the kind outmoded 
economic and legal theories offered—demanded a fundamental transformation in the relations 
between labor and capital.  “[T]he sense of being subject to the power of the employer,” 
Brandeis maintained, “can not be removed without changing the conditions under which industry 
is being carried on.”
216
  Such transformation could be achieved, he thought, only when labor 
actively participated in management.
217
  Brandeis praised worker cooperatives and urged unions 
to focus less on higher wages and more on securing a place in corporate governance.
218
  For 
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Brandeis, such “industrial liberty” not only mirrored traditional political liberty; it was a 
precondition for it.
219
  If workers lacked industrial liberty, Brandeis argued, “[m]ust not this 
mean that the American who is brought up with the idea of political liberty must surrender what 
every citizen deems far more important, his industrial liberty?  Can this contradiction—our grand 
political liberty and this industrial slavery—long coexist?”
220
 
 Brandeis understood that such industrial liberty depended on labor and capital 
confronting each other on a more even plain.  Government, he believed, could help correct the 
power asymmetry that kept labor in thrall to capital.  If government were enlisted to the cause of 
labor, it could magnify the power of unions and help emancipate workers from the grip of 
capital.
221
  For Brandeis, legislation guaranteeing collective bargaining rights, a minimum wage, 
maximum hours, and decent working conditions was necessary to augment the power of labor in 
its struggle with capital.  “Industrial liberty on the part of the worker cannot . . . exist if there be 
overweening industrial power[,]” Brandeis insisted.  “Some curb must be placed upon capitalistic 
combination.”
222
  The economic pressures that impelled workers to accept raw bargains might 
overwhelm a labor movement whose only asset was an ever-fragile solidarity.  But a labor 
movement armed with a legal guarantee of collective bargaining rights, a fair wage, and tolerable 
hours and working conditions could threaten firms with a protracted loss of their entire labor 
force.  The aim, as Brandeis put it, was to “equalize before the law the position of workingmen 
and employer as industrial combatants.”
223
  The untrammeled market had thrust a wrenching 
choice upon labor: unemployment and poverty, or submission to exploitation.  Government 
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could balance the scales by forcing a dilemma on capital: compromise with labor, or risk serious 
disruptions to production.  Government thus helped to upend a coercive power imbalance.
224
  Far 
from imperiling freedom, a government allied to labor was indispensable to it.
225
   
This is not to contend that Brandeis’s commitment to labor rights derived solely from his 
desire to guarantee freedom for workers.  Indeed, Brandeis viewed government support for 
organized labor as a means of combating privation and inequality as well as industrial despotism. 
 “[T]rade unions,” Brandeis asserted, “have been largely instrumental in securing reasonable 
hours of labor and proper conditions of work; in raising materially the scale of wages, and in 
protecting women and children from industrial oppression.”
226
  Ultimately, however, Brandeis 
viewed improvements in workers’ material conditions as subsidiary to the cause of freedom.
227
  
For Brandeis, labor rights did not merely contribute to social and economic amelioration; they 
enshrined in law a vision of freedom for the industrial age.  Government, as the handmaiden of 
organized labor, furthered that vision; the unfettered market, as the province of capital, subverted 
it. 
Brandeis’s notion of collective bargaining rights as a cudgel against industrial tyranny 
would later appear in the preambles to the New Deal’s chief legislative forays into the field of 
labor relations: the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, also known as the Anti-Injunction Act, and 
the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, also known as the Wagner Act.  The preamble to the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act set out the condition the Act sought to remedy: namely, that “under 
prevailing economic conditions . . . the individual worker is commonly helpless to exercise 
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actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable 
terms and conditions of employment.”
228
   
In like fashion, the Wagner Act recognized that the doctrine of liberty of contract had 
obscured a coercive power structure and sustained a kind of economic bondage.  In seeking to 
redress the “inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom 
of association or actual liberty of contract and employers who are organized in the corporate or 
other forms of ownership association[,]” the Wagner Act safeguarded the freedom of workers 
and struck a blow against the tyranny of the untrammeled market.
229
  Government acted in this 
instance not as a source of constraint, but as a vehicle for worker emancipation.
230
   
None of this is to argue that Brandeis viewed government as a wholly benign actor in the 
struggle between labor and capital.  Brandeis knew well that, while industrial titans and their 
conservative allies clung to the doctrine of laissez faire, they hastened to invoke the machinery 
of government to further their own interests.  Indeed, conservative judges and legislators were 
frequently enlisted to the cause of industrial despotism.
231
  Even beyond government’s 
complicity in the tyranny of capital over labor, however, Brandeis stood apart from many of his 
Progressive contemporaries in his distrust of centralized government power.  Though generally 
supportive of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, for instance, Brandeis balked when New Dealers 
sought to consolidate power in the federal government.
232
  With power concentrated in the 
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central government, Brandeis insisted, “we may get amelioration, but not a working ‘New Deal.’  
And we are apt to get Fascist manifestations.”
233
  For just as power centralized in remote 
corporate boardrooms endangered economic freedom, so too did authority concentrated in distant 
government bureaucracies threaten political freedom.
234
   
Still, Brandeis’s fear of centralized government power should not be mistaken for a more 
general aversion to robust government action designed to further the ideal of self-determination.  
For Brandeis, if concentrated industrial power created fertile ground for oppression, government 
could either prop up this coercive edifice, or it could help tear it down.  Brandeis sought to 
fashion a government committed to the latter course.
235
   
 c. Industrial Freedom and the Democratization of Self-Creation 
 
 Brandeis viewed the labor movement as an essential weapon in the American worker’s 
struggle against industrial despotism.  Yet, for Brandeis, the material gains of the labor 
movement—recognition of unions and collective bargaining rights, higher wages, and more 
humane hours and working conditions—were merely prelude to a more thorough-going 
transformation in industrial governance.  Brandeis understood that the advances of the labor 
movement provided much-needed physical relief to the American worker.  Here again, however, 
Brandeis conceived of material well-being not as an end in itself but rather as a precondition for 
mental and spiritual vitality.  The project of the labor movement, as Brandeis saw it, was not 
merely to guarantee prosperity to the American worker.  Rather, it was to cast off the yoke of 
capital and to empower workers to seize control of their own lives.  Only when workers were 
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liberated from their dependence on and subservience to capital could they develop the strength of 
mind and spirit that undergirded true freedom.
236
   
From Brandeis’s perspective, the goal of the labor movement was to imbue workers with 
the same sense of independence and self-ownership that animated the yeoman farmer and the 
small businessman.  The aim, that is, was to democratize the act of self-creation—the sine qua 
non of freedom in its spiritual and psychological as well as in its physical dimensions.  “[N]o 
remedy can be hopeful,” Brandeis insisted, “which does not devolve upon the workers 
participation in and responsibility for the conduct of business; and their aim should be the 
assumption of full responsibility—as in cooperative enterprises.”
237
  The ideal of the self-
sustaining small businessman was pivotal to Brandeis’s adaptation of Jeffersonianism to 20th 
century America.  But it was no panacea for the scourge of industrial despotism.  For most 
Americans would never enter the ranks of independent merchants, artisans, and shopkeepers.  
Rather, they would remain ordinary laborers engaged in a common enterprise, codependent 
pieces of a larger whole.
238
   
The question, then, was the extent to which they were able to determine the direction of 
that enterprise.  If workers passively executed the commands of others, they would languish in 
spiritual and psychological poverty, no matter the amelioration in their material conditions.  
Decent wages, tolerable hours, and more humane working conditions were necessary—but not 
sufficient—conditions for meaningful freedom.  If the American worker were to achieve the 
vitality of mind and spirit that the yeoman farmer and the small businessman embodied, he could 
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not rest with material progress.
239
  Only industrial democracy—understood as the right of 
workers to influence the nature and direction of productive enterprise—could forge individuals 
capable of self-creation and self-ownership.  For Brandeis, writes Strum, “[d]emocracy was not 
only the appropriate alternative to absolutism; it also possessed what might be called a 
psychological component. . . .  [T]he individual who was not continually involved in the formal 




Here again, Brandeis saw a division between material progress and industrial freedom, 
and while he generally conceived of material gains as a precursor to industrial liberty, he 
recognized that the two were not necessarily in harmony.  Indeed, Brandeis feared that 
corporations would use the promise of financial gain as leverage to thwart demands for industrial 
democracy.  He saw the emergence of company-funded pensions not as an advance for labor but 
as a tool of capital, as a kind of collateral that fastened capital’s grip on labor:  
Under the pension system everyone who remains with the corporation may look 
forward to getting a pension, but he has no right to it.  It is absolutely in the 
discretion of the directors whether or not he shall get it or if it shall be withdrawn 
even after it has been granted.  Anything that may in their opinion indicate that 
the worker is not loyal or working for the interests of the corporation . . . will 
result in loss of pension . . . .  [T]here is growing up under the guise of welfare 
work and efforts for more humane conditions for labor, a system which robs the 
laborer of what liberty he should have.  It is a condition which explains with 




For Brandeis, if workers were to achieve the strength of mind and spirit characteristic of 
the yeoman farmer and the small businessman, they had ultimately to take the reins of industrial 
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power themselves.  Unions and worker-protective legislation were essential to improving the 
material condition of the working class and thus to laying the groundwork for workers’ eventual 
assumption of responsibility for productive enterprise.  But only the regular exercise of power 
and creativity in a cooperative undertaking could yield the spiritual and psychological vigor 
necessary for genuine freedom.  For Brandeis, writes Strum, “[i]t was only the good citizen who 




The corollary of Brandeis’s conviction that freedom consisted not in the satisfaction of 
fleeting material desires, but rather in a more elevated and enduring state of being, was that 
freedom could not be provided; instead, it had to be attained.  By its very nature, freedom did not 
descend from the heights of power; it could not be bestowed by an external force.  Rather, it 
resided within, as a force to be awakened by the invigorating experience of self-creation.  For 
Brandeis, “life [was] not a having and a getting; but a being and a becoming.”
243
  Freedom 
emerged not from the “having and getting” of prosperity but rather from the “being and 
becoming” of self-creation.
244
  This conception of freedom as a thing to be achieved rather than 
conferred lay beneath Brandeis’s rejection of the technocratic elitism of Theodore Roosevelt’s 
New Nationalism.
245
  For Brandeis, freedom could not be ushered in by the benevolent 
stewardship of elite sages.  Rather, it demanded the empowerment of the citizenry. 
By contrast, Herbert Croly, among the most prominent New Nationalists, envisaged an 
energetic central government guided by the formula “Jeffersonian ends through Hamiltonian 
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  This fusion of Jefferson’s conception of man with Hamilton’s vision of government 
would place a cadre of enlightened experts at the helm of the national economy, with the aim of 
delivering a higher standard of living to the wider public.  The Hamiltonian vision, wrote Croly, 
“implied the predominance in American life of the men who had the energy and the insight to 
discriminate between those ideas and tendencies which promoted the national welfare, and those 
ideas and tendencies whereby it was imperiled.”
247
  For Brandeis, these were contradictions in 
terms.  Jeffersonian ends could only be achieved by Jeffersonian means.
248
  True freedom could 
not exist without genuine self-determination, and self-determination entailed not the top-down 
provision of fair wages and working conditions but rather direct worker control of productive 
enterprise.   
Brandeis’s vision for labor, as such, was not one of prosperity bestowed by a beneficent 
employer. “[W]hat we want,” Brandeis averred, “is to have the workingman free, not to have 
him the beneficiary of a benevolent employer . . . .”
249
  Rather, Brandeis envisioned the 
workplace as a vibrant democracy, fueled by a dynamic process of exchange and cooperation 
between self-governing workers.  He recognized that widespread industrial democracy was not 
an imminent prospect.  Rather, it would be the culmination of a long evolution: 
In my judgment, we are going through the following stages: We already have had 
industrial despotism.  With the recognition of the unions, this is changing into a 
constitutional monarchy, with well-defined limitations placed about the 
employers’ formerly autocratic power.  Next comes profit-sharing.  This, 
however, is to be only a transitional, half-way stage.  The eventual outcome 
promises to be full-grown industrial democracy.
250
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Even in Brandeis’s day, however, there had emerged successful worker cooperatives—in 
particular in parts of England and Scandinavia—and Brandeis looked admiringly upon these 
shining examples of worker self-rule.
251
 
For Brandeis, industrial democracy was to the American worker what stewardship of 
arable land was to the yeoman farmer and what control over independent commercial enterprise 
was to the small businessman: a crucible of self-creation that engendered the sturdy character of 
the free individual.  “[T]ens of thousands more Americans could be rendered competent to guide 
our important businesses[,]” Brandeis argued.  “Liberty is the greatest developer.”
252
  Industrial 
democracy, as such, was not only the vehicle through which workers maintained their 
sovereignty over their labor and environment; it was also the mechanism that kept the vigor and 
self-reliance of the citizen from deteriorating into the passivity and subordination of the subject.  
“Herodotus tells us that while the tyrants ruled, the Athenians were no better fighters than their 
neighbors[,]” Brandeis wrote.  “[B]ut when freed, they immediately surpassed all others.  If 




It is here that the kinship between Jefferson’s ward republic and Brandeis’s vision of 
industrial democracy is most manifest.  For Jefferson, the ward republic was the organ through 
which the demos exercised control over society, but it was also a galvanic force, a means of 
engaging and energizing the mind and spirit of the citizen.
254
  This was precisely how Brandeis 
conceived of industrial democracy: both as a source of power and control and as a wellspring of 
vigor and enrichment.  The latter function was no less essential to freedom—both of the 
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individual and of the demos—than was the former.  For Brandeis, democracy did not subsume 
the individual personality beneath a pallid sameness, as in libertarian thought.  Instead, it vivified 
and strengthened that personality.
255
 
Industrial democracy was Brandeis’s attempt, in an ever more urban and industrial 
society, to democratize the freedom of the yeoman farmer and the small businessman.  In a free 
society, the ideals of self-creation and self-ownership could not be the exclusive property of an 
enterprising few.  “Here and there you will find a hero,—red-blooded, and courageous,—loving 
manhood more than wealth, place or security,—who dared to fight for independence and won[,]” 
Brandeis wrote.  “Here and there you may find the martyr, who resisted in silence and suffered 
with resignation.  But America . . . cannot be content with conditions that fit only the hero, the 
martyr or the slave.”
256
   
For Brandeis, there had to be space for average citizens to assert themselves as free and 
independent agents.  “The civilized world today believes that in the industrial world self-
government is impossible; that we must adhere to . . . the system of master and servant, or, as 
now more politely called, employer and employee,” Brandeis proclaimed.  “It rests with this 
century . . . to prove that as we have in the political world shown what self-government can do, 
we are to pursue the same lines in the industrial world.”
257
  Brandeis arrived at freedom by way 
of democracy, and it is this nexus—where individual liberty meets the ideal of the demos as 
applied to the workplace—that both distinguishes Brandeisian thought and commends it to the 
present day. 
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 The financial crisis of 2007-08 introduced the American public to numerous arcane 
financial concepts, from “mortgage-backed securities” to “subprime lending” to “credit-default 
swaps.”  Perhaps the most enduringly relevant neologism to emerge from the crisis, however, has 
been the concept “too big to fail.”  This stands for the proposition that the failure of certain 
financial institutions would pose so grave a “systemic risk” to the economy that government 
would need to intervene to prevent their collapse.  In the wake of the financial meltdown, the 
federal government did precisely that, rescuing pivotal financial firms from the brink of ruin and 
restoring safety and soundness to the financial system.  The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 imposed 
new regulatory burdens on financial institutions, but it left intact the “too big to fail” goliaths that 
were at the center of the 2007-08 collapse.  From a Brandeisian perspective, it is difficult to 
imagine a more disturbing sequence of events: the perpetration of a fraud against a bewildered 
public by distant and opaque financial firms, followed by a new layer of federal regulation and a 
squandered opportunity to dissolve the “too big to fail” behemoths once and for all.   
 There was at least one silver lining to the financial meltdown of 2007-08, however.  Far 
from the terrain of freedom, the untrammeled market was exposed as a site of reckless 
exploitation.  Seldom in American history had the libertarian conflation of freedom with the 
unfettered market seemed so misguided.  In the main, however, the emancipatory potential of 
government went unfulfilled.  Rather than heed Brandeis’s admonitions against concentrated 
power, the federal government sought to manage “too big to fail” institutions in the Rooseveltian 
mold.  Rather than liberate the public from the clutches of corporate control, government cast 
itself as an organ of stasis and stability.  Yet the opportunity remains to redefine government as 
an instrument of liberation.  Seizing that opportunity demands that the American Left search its 
 68 
past for guidance.  The political and economic thought of Louis D. Brandeis stands as an ideal 
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